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Introduction 
 
What a difference as compared to the early nineties, which were judged through the fervour and 
the intellectual lenses of Fukuyama’s end of history famous article and book. In a fundamental 
sense the author was right: 1989 marked a watershed in history, signalling the decisive demise of 
communism. In another sense, his analysis was simplifying and obscuring resilient forces at 
work in history, those which maintain ideological and religious differences; forces which, when 
uncurbed by democracy (checks and balances) and mutual tolerance, can lead to huge human 
suffering, such as inter-ethnic conflicts and wars. 
 
Transition proves to be a much more compex and complicated process than initially though 
about. Price liberalization, stabilization, privatization are essential for achieving a market 
economy but far from securing success unless proper institutions are put in place. And this is the 
biggest challenge for post-communist countries: how to enhance institutional build up when this 
is a time consuming process, and, at the same time, there is a race against time.  
 
At the start, many were, for obvious reasons, tempted to underestimate two major other 
transitions in the world, which do have an impact on post-communist transformation. One 
transition is connected with integration in Europe and the advent of the Monetary Union, with its 
myriad of consequences. Incidentally, the creation of the Community in 1957 (The Traty of 
Rome) was meant to help liberal democracies deal with the threat of communism. Nowadays, 
the further integration of the EU is intertwined with attempts to reform itself, namely, the 
welfare state, the CAP, etc; which is a difficult process which bears on enlargement. It should be 
said that, soon after the start of post-communist transition, most of the countries in Central and 
eastern Europe entered a quest to join the Club. For economic, but also security-related reasons, 
the admission into the EU was set as the overriding strategic choice of foreign and economic 
policy. Therefore, joining the EU could easily be seen as a final benchmark in the assessment of 
a successful transformation. Implicitely, a way to compare the performances of post-communist 
countries is to examine their prospects for accession. The other strategic choice for many post-
communist countries was getting into NATO. Whereas this goal was achieved by Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech republic, for most of the other aspirant countries the road is still remote.  
 
Globalization is another major process in the world economy, which goes beyond the evolution 
of financial markets and, following the deep crises worldwide, the search for improving the 
architecture of the international financial system. Globalization should be seen, also, through its 
impact on social and political structures, the way it fosters both integration and fragmentation, 
inclusion and exclusion, uncertainty and volatility (bad equilibria)1; it does influence the clash 
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of ideas as well. In this respect, whereas some declare the definitive victory of markets over 
governments, others are looking for a way to reconcile the virtues of markets with the need to 
preserve social cohesion and the ability to pursue public purpose. But, as Larry Summers pointed 
out at the last ABCDE conference in Washington DD, reconciling the imperative of open 
markets and the pursuit of public purpose requires, still, much intellectual work and institutional 
development (1999, p.1). 
 
Global alliances and acquisitions in the banking industry, in oil, car manufacturing, 
telecommunication, etc., are ushering in a new era in world competition which is intensified by 
the new information technologies. What one sees in Europe nowadays, in terms of mergers and 
acquisitions, validates this trend. Could one have foreseen, only some years ago, the way 
consolidation is proceeding in the dirigistique France: with the hostile bid by BNP to take over 
Societee Generale?  
 
Likewise, the introduction of the Euro, in spite of its recent weakness, symbolyzes EU’s claims 
to compete with the US economy and Asian economies. The fight for leadership of the World 
Trade Organization (which, for the first time, pitted a representative of  emerging markets 
against one of the rich countries) indicates the redistribution of economic power in the world and 
the new assertiveness of Asia. The Euro may also give a further impetus to the formation of 
large trading and currency blocs, with the latter being a response to the uncertainty and volatility 
caused by destabilizing capital movements (let us think about the requests made by several Latin 
American countries to adopt the US dollar as their national currency). This increased uncertainty 
gives an additional incentive to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to join the EU.  
 
In what follows the prospects of post-communist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe 
are examined according to an inner logic of the process, but also in conjunction with what is 
going on in Europe as a whole –including dynamics in Russia and in the Balkans. The analysis is 
not meant to be exhaustive, but to highlight what I see as relevant features and factors of motion 
during transformation. Likewise, the impact of globalization is considered. The focus is on the 
exigencies of forwarding market reforms, of empowering citizens, together with the need to 
perform public policy for the common good. I should commend, in this context,  the initiative of 
the President of the World Bank, James Wolfenson, the so-called Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF), which reflects a deeper understanding of the complexity and ultimate goals 
of transformation as a modernization (development) process.2  
 
1. An initial glimpse 
  
 There is good and bad news about post-communist transformation in Europe. The good news 
is that, overall, much has been achieved bearing in mind the burden of the past – or, otherwise 
said, the current state of affairs could have been substantially worse. A certain kind of normalcy 
has been spreading in the area in terms of the functioning patterns of market-based systems. 
Even the participation rates in the elections in most countries can be interpreted from such a 
perspective. This normalcy may be partly at the origin of an apparent declining interest Western 
public opinion and governments show in post-communist transformation It is true, nonetheless, 
that this diminishing interest can be linked with the mounting domestic problems of some 
western European governments and other world developments. However, the notion normalcy 
takes into account what realists – as they can be named – have been saying is most likely to 
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 occur, or is achievable under the circumstances. Such realists warned that transformation will be 
a time-consuming process, that the past weighs heavily in post-communist countries. 
Economic recovery has been under way in many countries for years now, and inflation, at 
least temporarily, has been subdued in many countries. The work of entrepreneurship and the 
expansion of the private sector proves the enormous economic potential that was stifled by the 
command system.  
Another piece of good news is the way the emerging democratic institutions have been able 
to vent, the frustration of large segments of the citizenry with the costs of reforms and secured, 
thereby, a surprising degree of social stability. This fact is gives support to those who have 
argued that history and analogies are not necessarily the best predictor of what is going to 
happen in Central and Eastern Europe. It is hard not to agree, in this respect, with Valerie Bunce 
when she remarked early on that ‘It is the balance between levels of conflict and systemic 
capacity to adjudicate conflicts, then, and not simply the degree of conflict which should receive 
our foremost attention in assessing the stability of the new Eastern Europe’ ( p. 281). But it can 
be contended with similar validity, that it would be a major mistake to consider that post-
communist countries are endowed with some specific traits which make them relatively immune 
to what acute social friction entails in the rest of the world. The probability for big and 
unpleasant surprises is still considerable, the farther one goes eastwards, where the results of 
transformation are very mixed, to put it gently. Scenes of acute social disruption occurred in 
Albania and Bulgaria some years ago and, in most of the CIS countries, authoritarian 
governments control power. And if one considers, also, size –as in the case of Russia and 
Ukraine—worries are more than justified. 
The bad news, or ‘the empty half of the glass’ is that, in many post-communist countries the 
high hopes of quick transition have been disproved; that lots of people in the region have had a 
very hard time in coping with the psychological pressure and material difficulties caused by 
transformation.  
The geography of transition is very diverse. One can detect clusters, groups of countries 
which differentiate among themselves as to economic performance and the way institutions do 
function.  
There are frontrunners –Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia; 
these are followed by the other two Baltic countries. Both these two groups of countries have 
good prospects to join the EU around the middle of the next decade. It is noteworthy, and I 
would stress it again and again, that the best performers are in the neighbourhood of the EU. 
And not accidentally, have highest income per head.  
Bulgaria and Romania, which also have Association Agreements with the EU, have had a 
much more difficult trajectory and their prospects to join the Union are considerably less 
favorable.  
In Russia and Ukraine, and in the rest of the CIS,  transition, both politically and 
economically, is still pretty cloudy. For most of the Balkans area the terms “distress economies” 
would seem quite appropriate. Tabel 1 illustrates this classification by making reference to 
growth rates, inflation, the income per capita, etc.. 
 
2. Understanding transformation: reading the future from the past 
 
I would argue that the best way to explore the future is to read carefully the past and the present. 
This is why, next my endeavour is to highlight some lessons of transformation . 
 
2.1 The grammar of transition: Complexity is a key word 
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2.1.1  A major lessons of transformation is the need to be open minded,  to consider various 
hypotheses and viewpoints, not to be prisoner of clichés and taboos, of understanding that there 
can be no perfect blueprints as there cannot be a perfect world. The need of lucidity and 
pragmatism should compel us to keep our eyes open and confront a reality, which can be 
overwhelming by its complexity and the magnitude of changes. 
 -Some years ago, those who were prone to emphasize the structural nature of the problems 
facing post-communist countries made up a minority in the chorus of upbeat voices; they warned 
about the lack of realism of the theses and conceptions which smelled of the possibility of 
compressing time at will, of practising a sort of ‘hocus pocus economics’. Now, many analysts 
reveal a different, significantly more poised stance. A policy should be judged on its own merits 
by skewing intellectual prejudices. 
In this respect, there is need to consider how market economies actually function. As Joseph 
Stiglitz emphasized, ‘Imperfect and costly information, imperfect capital markets, imperfect 
competition: these are the realities of market economies – aspects that must be taken into 
account by those countries embarking on the choice of an economic system’(1994, p.267).  
- the danger of overlooking the extreme complexity of the process under way. Gross 
oversimplifications and reductionism of the type ‘black vs. white’ (with no shades in-between), 
and the lack of understanding of how interests are socially articulated – particularly in a 
transition period – cannot but obscure real processes and lead to hasty and inadequate decisions. 
G. Schopflin aptly noted, ‘The elite failed to understand that society was a far more complex 
organism than what they had thought, that simple, well-meaning declarations were not effective 
in politics, that ideas and programmes would have to be sold to the public, and that institutions 
were necessary for the routinised exercise of power’ (1994, p. 130). 
-An increasing number of professionals emphasize the role of institutions in economic 
development3, the burden of history, and the intensity of what Francois Perroux named ‘emprise 
de la structure’ (the power of structure), with the latter including the legacy of resource 
misallocation and the strain it entails in the system. Here one can talk about the structural 
(social) embeddedness of economic phenomena (Marc Granovetter, 1985), which is an approach 
having as illustrious precursors Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Such a broad analytical 
perspective lends to transformation a much richer meaning and content. 
-Dealing with the fine print of reforms involves much more than simple ideological statements 
and exhortations; it involves unavoidable pragmatism and making hard policy choices based on 
solid theoretical and empirical knowledge, when one cannot escape facing painful trade-offs and 
dilemmas. For instance, one issue that badly needs serious debate is the structure of corporate 
governance; it is ever more clear that one needs to go beyond the general statement regarding 
the necessity of privatisation 
- There is need to place the process into a world-wide context. What I have in mind is Western 
European countries’s reinforced quest for integration, the crisis of the welfare state, shifting 
comparative advantages under the impact of the ‘new information age’ and of economic 
globalisation, etc. I think also of the pressure the globalisation of financial markets imposes on 
national economic policies, and the related increasing marginal cost of imprudent and 
inconsistent measures over time. Embeddedness into a wide context helps detect both the 
expected and the new sources of difficulties encountered by post-communist countries, and what 
may lie ahead for them. 
  
2.1.2 There has been an excessive temptation to lump countries together, in various groups, by 
assuming a pretty much deterministic (mechanical) relationship between preordained results and 
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 policies implied by a conventional wisdom. As in the old Latin saying ‘post hoc, ergo propter 
hoc’ close performances were ascribed more to presumed similar policies than to commonalties 
in initial circumstances, structural factors and policy peculiarities. 
 It suffices to look carefully at concrete policies among the front-runners to support such a 
thesis . Poland became the ‘classical example’ of shock therapy regarding price liberalisation, 
but not privatisation. At the same time, Hungary, in spite of a remarkable policy consistency can 
be viewed as an example of gradualism, and its economic performances are due also to reforms 
initiated before 1989. As to the Czech Republic, it applied a big-bang to privatisation…and a 
sort of heterodox stabilisation policy. Slovenia, because of its favorable initial conditions, 
applied a sort of gradualistic policy. 
 In my view, certain traits of politics and social life, of the local (national) industrial and 
political culture, and other structural factors have strong explanatory power for understanding 
policymaking. It may be the case that culture and history (the burden of the past), geography and 
structural factors explain, to a large extent, why certain policies (like macroeconomic 
stabilisation) were more likely to be undertaken and were more successful in certain countries 
than in others. 
 
2.1.3  Instead of being absorbed by preferred clichés and ideal frameworks one should pay more 
attention to closer-to-reality second-best scenarios --broaden the focus of analysis. This logic 
would have to apply to both first round as well as n-round (feedback) policy measures. 
Frequently and with surprising nonchalance, those who pass judgement or provide advice equate 
non-adherence to a ‘first-best’ policy-package to lack of political will. Political determination is 
clearly an essential ingredient of policy formulation and implementation, but far from sufficient 
in order to gain credibility and achieve success. 
 Janos Kornai pointedly remarked that ‘Those who attach intrinsic value to democratic 
institutions must consider in their proposals the existing power relations and the rules of 
parliamentary democracy. We are not going to achieve much if we rely on advice of this kind: it 
is our job to advise you about what is good for your country and your job to take advice. If you 
do not take it, that is your problem. We cannot help it if your politicians are stupid or malicious’ 
(p. 5). This is a strong prodding to consider the political economy of reform in the post-
communist countries.   
 
Relatedly, one has to ask whether the advocated ‘first-best’ policies are actually realistic, 
irrespective of circumstances. For example, can one really believe that not paying wages and 
salaries to many people, who are still employed, is a sustainable policy which can durably defeat 
high inflation? Alternatively, what is the meaning of a small-consolidated budget deficit if 
arrears as well as the quasi-fiscal deficit are growing? In addition, is the non-inflationary 
financing of the budget deficit sustainable when its service is skyrocketing because of very high 
positive real interest rates? It appears that, sometimes, some pundits disconnect what is desirable 
– from a results oriented perspective – from what is achievable, in terms of policy, under the 
circumstances.  
 
2.2 Two major underplayed issues 
 
Two issues, in my view, have been constantly underestimated. One issue regards the burden of 
the past (backwardness) of the former command systems; the other issue refers to the magnitude 
of required resource reallocation in relation to the new relative prices dictated by liberalisation 
and to the opening of the economy. 
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The burden of the past 
 
The post-communist societies of Europe are societal entities that show common (structural) 
traits, but also major discrepancies; the latter can be linked with the different pre-communist 
legacies (the former Czechoslovakia, as a leading industrial country during the inter-war period, 
is the most conspicuous example) and the different brands of national central planning, in terms 
of relaxation of direct controls and economic policy choices.  
 
The different histories explain widely different incomes per capita (tabel.1 and 2), why market 
institutions vary qualitatively among the national environments and why macro and micro-
disequilibria differed among them on the eve of 1989. Undoubtedly, Hungary, the former 
Czechoslovakia and Poland had a substantial competitive edge in starting the process of 
managing transition. Unsurprisingly, all these countries have fared better than the rest in their 
stabilisation programmes, although their recipes were not similar, as some would argue. 
Backwardness bears considerably on the potential for overcoming the performance deficit; it 
points, on one hand, at the lack of specific knowledge of individuals and of society as a whole 
and at the constraints for genuine institutional change and, on the other hand, it suggests that 
there is much scope for a system to get outside what can be conceived as an ideal tunnel of 
evolution. The stress put on the burden of the past is meant to warn against its dragging effects 
and an unfavourable path dependency, from which it may not be easy to break away. 
Backwardness makes it harder to overcome the fragility of the emerging market institutions and 
enhances the potential for the dynamics of change to get out of control; it does enhance 
institutional fragility, which was underestimated by policymakers and their advisers. As Peter 
Rutland rightly points out ‘in a travesty of Hayekian logic, it was assumed that market 
institutions would be self-generating’ (1994/95, p.11). 
The sintagma institutional fragility has been mentioned. Apart from the insufficient analytical 
attention paid to the institutional build-up in the transforming societies in Europe, one has to 
consider the seeds of instability produced by this fragility. The poor capacity of immature 
institutions to perform needs to be mentioned in this context. For example, the debate on 
universal vs. narrow banks (on whether and how banks should be involved in resource 
allocation) is quite relevant for the concern immature market institutions create in terms of 
enhancing instability and uncertainty in the system. Institutions explain also the size and the 
collectability of budget revenues (tabel.3). 
From a broader perspective one can pose the issue of the governance capabilities of the political 
and economic elites of these countries – to what extent these elites are capable to induce and 
manage change (transformation) when so much fuzziness, volatility and uncertainty is 
prevailing. One can also assume that institutional fragility will bear significantly on the nature of 
capitalism in the region. 
 
The magnitude of resource reallocation: the emergence of strain 
 
 In Eastern Europe, the structure of the economy and the legacy of resource misallocation, 
have put the system under exceptional strain once the combination of the internal shocks 
(engineered by reforms, or, simply, triggered by the uncontrolled processes of system 
dissolution) and external shocks occurred. (D.Daianu, 1994, 1997). 
  What are the major implications of this strain? One is that these economies can easily become 
exceedingly unstable and that their capacity to absorb shocks is quite low; these economies have 
a high degree of vulnerability! Another implication is that policymakers face extremely painful 
trade-offs and that, in most cases, unless policy is clever and sufficient external support is 
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 available, the room for manoeuvre is in practice, quite limited. Finally, macroeconomic 
stabilisation in certain countries hides deeply seated tensions which, sooner or later, come into 
the open unless deep restructuring takes place (Russia is the most glaring example). 
 
 
2.3.  Sources of policy succes  
 
Aside vision and the very quality of policy itself, I would highlight: 
 
- the initial conditions (including the legacy of resource misallocation) 
-  the history of partial reforms (which made certain environments more ‘market-friendly’), 
with Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia being in the forefront. 
-  the regime change, which led to periods of institutional interregnum. Again, the countries 
which benefitted on previous reforms and some collective memory achieved better results 
(Blanchard, 1997); 
-  the role of foreign capital in triggering a virtuous circle.  Particularly the last factor seems to 
have played a very significant role in the front-runner economies; this role is better 
understood bearing in mind the extreme complexity and complicated nature (the very high 
cost) of deep restructuring of economy. One can argue that some of the fast growing 
economies of Asia relied less on foreign capital and that, in their case, the essential factor 
was the very high savings ratios (35-40%). Undoubtedly, such ratios are good for economic 
growth and economic policy should strive to stimulate them. Nonetheless, I dare to say that 
geographic and historical circumstances make foreign capital play a special role in the post-
communist countries. 
- geography, well illustrated by the performance of the cluster of countries bordering the EU. 
 
Policy credibility, itself, depends on how much structural adjustment the system can undergo in 
a period covered by the respective policy; and the capacity to adjust depends, basically, on 
structure, on the dimension of required resource reallocation, and on the quality of institutions as 
premises for policymaking. A ‘credibility paradox’ seems to be at play here: those who need to 
be more credible are not (cannot be) because of the magnitude of required resource reallocation 
and of overall institutional change, and their related costs – what I called strain in the system; 
whereas those who can afford not to undertake similarly painful changes (e.g. Hungary) enjoy 
more credibility due to the, relatively, smaller scale of needed structural adjustment. Obviously, 
a political element has to be factored in as well, which includes the reputation of policymakers. 
It is like in a “winners’ take all” situation, which was well illustrated by the way market 
sentiment turned against most of the countries in transition in the wake of the Russian financial 
meltdown. 
  
Credibility and the boldness of policy can be much enhanced by political climate and various sui 
generis anchors, such as the prospects for joining the EU and NATO .This also explains why, 
where there has been a political backlash at the polls no major policy reversals occurred in most 
of the reforming countries. Nonetheless the question which automatically comes to one’s mind is 
what would happen if policy and social fatigue combine with receding prospects (for some, or 
most of the countries) to join the two institutions in the near future.  
  
2.4 Reading the map of transformation: links to the future 
  
2.4.1 Macroeconomic stabilization is necessary, but far from providing the benchmark between 
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success and failure. 
2.4.2 Structural reforms are key to achieving macroeconomic stability, stability in general; 
whereas the marginal costs of delayed reforms increase over time there seems to be limits to how 
much one can speed up reforms. 
2.4.3. Institutional build-up takes time; the lack of proper institutions, of social and 
organizational capital (trust)  is inimical to the functioning of society –“Waiting for the 
Postman”!!! 
 
2.4.4 Because of their major structural distortions (including resource misallocation) and the 
fragility of their institutions, the transforming economies have an almost in-built mechanism for 
subjecting themselves to intense strain. Very few countries have made big strides as far as deep 
restructuring is concerned and much of the potential strain has been mitigated by the effects of 
heavy capital inflows. It can be submitted that feeble deep restructuring maintains a high degree 
of actual and potential strain in the system. This issue needs to be emphasised since the 
resumption of growth on a large area may have caused more optimism than is actually 
warranted. One should not overlook that what is happening now is more economic recovery 
from an extremely depressed level of production – even if correction is made for formerly 
useless production – and that this was helped by relatively easily obtained efficiency gains; that, 
over time, unless investment ratios are high, unless there is constant upgrading of the quality of 
output (tradeables), and there is a good functioning of institutions, growth will stall. 
 
2.4.5 The implosion of the Mexican economy at the end of 1994 and the financial crisis in East 
Asia, in an indirect way, the chaos in Albania in 1996 and the financial meltdown in Russia in 
1998, in a direct way, suggest how fragile and vulnerable post-communist economies are; these 
events also show how deceptive macroeconomic figures can be when they are not supported by 
the strength of real economy and solid institutions. One should not forget that Mexico was hailed 
in the early 90s as a role-model all over the world; and, in the mid-90s,  Albania, and Russia, a 
few years ago, were considered success stories for their macroeconomic stabilisation and other 
reforms. 
 The fragility and vulnerability of the transforming economies should be judged against the 
background of globalising financial markets. The East Asian crisis, the Mexican crisis, and also 
the hard times the Argentinean policymakers had in managing the ‘tequila effect’ (the currency 
board did not make the economy soundproof and IFOs money had to be asked for!) come to 
one’s mind. There are several aspects to think about here. One regards the link between the 
development of financial markets and the progress made in the real economy. It can be 
submitted that the degree of volatility of domestic financial markets would be exceedingly high 
unless there is sufficient restructuring of the economy. Conversely, it can be argued that capital 
markets do enhance restructuring which may suggest that one faces a chicken and egg problem 
in this respect. 
 There is here a policy conundrum, which outlines a multi-question one needs to answer: how 
would financial markets better serve the transforming economies and, implicitly, how should be 
they developed? Do financial markets influence the nature of capital inflows (when real interest 
rates are high and induce speculative inflows) and if that is the case what are policy 
implications? Is there a need for capital controls? I would argue yes: there should be controls on 
short-term capital flows and financial market liberalization should proceed carefully4. Another 
aspect is linked with the acute need for much prudence and wisdom in macroeconomic policy. 
                                                 
4 As Frederic Mishkin says, “although financial liberalization is a worthy policy goal, it does not have to be 
pursued with the neglect of the need to build proper institutional structures of supervision and regulation, in 
order to avoid financial distasters; this would imply a controlled pace of financial liberalization”(1996,p.41) 
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 Another aspect to highlight is the urgent need to strengthen the supervision of the banking 
industry; since many banks are congenitally fragile, quite prone to poor lending, and heavily 
fraught by conflicts of interest; it goes without saying that better supervision should be exerted 
on financial institutions as well. 
  
2.4.6  Persistent and high structural unemployment could become very burdensome for reform 
policies – a hysteresis phenomenon may develop quite disturbingly unless proper labour markets 
policies are developed. Current unemployment rates in the transforming economies are not 
exceedingly high in comparison with the European levels of the mid-nineties and this could 
assuage the perception of strain. However, several factors provide cause for concern. One is that 
the yardstick used is itself questionable taking into account the unemployment problem in 
Western Europe. A second factor is the weakness of safety nets; this problem acquires particular 
significance in the poorer post-communist countries, where the consequences of a ‘new type’ of 
poverty could be extremely serious (think that the Gini coefficient in Russia exceeded 60%, 
being close to the level in Brazil!).5  And another factor is the fact that restructuring of large 
companies – which mostly need to shed labour in order to become profitable – is very slow, or, 
in practice, not taking place; this means that potential unemployment increases are still very 
significant. 
 
2.4.7 The experience of Latin America and East Asia shows that widely diverging wealth 
discrepancies are not conducive to social stability and long-term growth.6 The implied policy 
requirement is more than challenging since it needs to fit into the general pattern of market-
based reforms which involve income differentiation; it also needs to help the transforming 
economies become more flexible (adaptable) instead of being mired into social rigidities – which 
would be fatal in a world increasingly subjected to the pressures of globalisation. In any case this 
is a domain which may critically test the governance capabilities of the elites in the transforming 
economies in the years to come; these elites would have to solve what Arthur Okun coined as the 
‘Big Trade-off’ more than two decades ago. 
 One should also mention an increasingly intense distribution struggle, and an erosion of the 
consensus for societal change when many individuals appear as losers – once market forces start 
to reward people in accordance with merit, effort, good ideas, and inspiration, but also as a result 
of some workers’ misfortune to have jobs in bad (unprofitable) enterprises. 
 
2.4.8 As to privatisation, what took many hundreds of years in the advanced capitalist countries 
is supposed to occur, through various procedures (more or less legal), in the post-communist 
countries, in a snapshot on the scale of history. It is not, therefore, surprising that everything 
surrounding this process is so highly charged emotionally – why so many hopes, dreams, 
reckless and ruthless actions, misbehaviour, and delusions are linked to it. All individuals want 
to be on the winning side, but markets cannot make them all happy. The nature of capitalism in 
the post-communist countries will be decisively influenced by the actual results of privatisation 
as a process. If privatisation results in the development of a strong middle class as the social 
backbone of the new economic system, stability and vigour will be secured, and democratic 
institutions will develop. Otherwise, the new system in the making will be inherently unstable – 
like the bad Latin American model – with politics quite likely to take an authoritarian route. 
 
                                                 
5 Including the potential for the appearance of aggressive extreme-left groups, liable to engage in domestic and 
international terrorism. The existence of extreme-right (fascist) groups would compound the danger. 
6 See also the late M. Bruno quoted by William Pfaff (1996). He was, at that time, Chief Economist of the 
World Bank. 
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2.4.9 Communism – as an economic system – functioned as a kind of poor and steadily 
declining (suffering from economic euthanasia) but, nonetheless, ‘welfare state’—what Kornai 
called a ‘premature welfare system’ (1994,p.16). The post-communist countries maintain among 
the most generous social welfare budgets in the world when calculated as a share of GDP; social 
spending budgets are between 15-30% of GDP as compared to 5-10% in the case of East Asian 
countries at similar income levels, for similar social programmes.7 As in Western countries, 
where there exist powerful vested interests which oppose economic adjustment, in post-
communist countries those who cannot compete on the markets have turned into a strong 
coalition of interests which can slow down, or even arrest reforms. This mass of individuals is 
most likely to fall prey to populist slogans and is obviously inclined to support left-oriented 
parties. Robert Gilpin’s observation, that adjustment is very difficult in welfare states, applies 
mutatis mutandis in the case of post-communist countries. It is striking how the need for western 
countries to reform their welfare systems compares with the post-communist countries’ need to 
restructure their public budgets.  
  
2.5 A phenomenon, which reflects with much intensity the institutional fragility and the 
complicated nature and complexity of transformation, is the ubiquity of lawlessness – the 
‘blossoming’ of organised crime and corruption. There is no doubt that much of it is just an 
outcome of activities becoming less hidden. It is also true that some of what appears as illegal 
activity is due to the still very fuzziness of the legal environment, and to the emerged need to 
privatise contract enforcement when official law enforcement capability is almost non-existent. 
However, there is also an element of novelty in this field, which, in certain cases, can take 
frightening forms and proportions. Where bankers, businessmen and journalists are murdered, 
this has an impact on the social psyche that is not favourable to market and democracy nurturing 
reforms.  
A very detrimental vicious circle can be at play here. Thus, because of institutional fragility 
(actually, owing to the lack of socially accepted norms and of authorities capable to enforce, and 
protect them should the need arise) organised crime and lawlessness, in general, do proliferate. 
Simultaneously, their proliferation undermines the very effectiveness of the budding democratic 
institutions. Consequently, the so-called ‘proto-democratic institutions’ are likely to remain in a 
limbo state for a long period. 
One can, normally, pose the following question: what kind of capitalism is being built in the 
transforming economies? An optimistic answer would be twofold. Firstly, the picture is too 
multicoloured for justifying an all encompassing answer – the intensity of the phenomenon is 
different in the various national environments (the Czech Republic is different from, let’s say, 
Ukraine) and, therefore, its consequences and prospects are dissimilar. In fact, different kinds of 
capitalism are emerging in the post-communist countries. Secondly, the presumption should be 
accepted that this phenomenon would recede over time in keeping with the unfolding of 
transformation. A pessimistic answer would highlight the vicious circle mentioned above – as a 
conspicuous instance of ‘path dependency’ – and the enhancing factor represented by rising 
unemployment and poverty among large segments of society, as well as the increasing mistrust 
of the citizenry as to an apparently impotent and corrupted government bureaucracy.. A 
pessimistic answer would also point out the danger that the tentacles of organised crime would 
increasingly influence the functioning of institutions, and encroach on the political process, 
ultimately, in a resilient fashion; something resembling organised crime as a phenomenon in 
Italy, or in Mexico and Columbia, would come into being, but it would very likely have its 
                                                 
7 Jeffrey Sachs, 1995b, p.2. Although I agree with the main point he makes, I think Sachs underestimates the 
importance of distributional effects entailed by reforms; a lot depends on the balance between winners and 
losers. 
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 peculiarities.  
Both Eastern and Western governments should not be complacent about this phenomenon, in 
the hope that it may prove ‘benign’ and useful for building up market-based economic systems 
in the long run.The creation of SECI (South East Europe Cooperation Initiative) reflects this 
concern. 
 
3. What shapes policy? 
 
The emergence of the private economy (including the second economy) at the grass root level, 
and the creation of sui generis forms of financial intermediaries, occurred spontaneously in all 
the post-communist countries. However, there is another side of the process, which refers to 
institutional change by design; the latter can have a heavy dosage of imitation, or can present 
novel features. 
 It can be said, therefore, that institutional change is the result of the interaction between 
spontaneous change and large scale reengineering. This interaction will shape policy in te future 
as well. 
 
 Institutional change by design: are there any guiding principles? 
 
 Firstly, the interaction between the realm of ideas and policy is to be mentioned. The neo-
classical paradigm considers quick reallocation of resources and the maximisation procedures of 
agents. Simultaneously, a frictionless environment is taken as the standard and adjustment 
processes are viewed as being quickly triggered by price liberalisation. Rigidities are largely 
discounted which, further, would suggest that public intervention in managing adjustment is 
thought unnecessary. The neo-classical approach also underestimates the time-consuming nature 
of building up institutions and their impact on economic performance. The Washington 
Consensus illustrates this paradigm for transformation8. 
 Two other competing paradigms exist which provide a rationale for public intervention in the 
economy. One is the Neo-keynesian approach which takes for granted the imperfection of 
markets; information and transaction costs, rigidities all compound in portraying an economy in 
which adjustments cannot be frictionless and in which there can appear large externalities 
(positive and negative). Whereas some Neo-keynesians are quite ambivalent whether public 
intervention can be effective (Gregory Mankiw), others – like Joseph Stiglitz – are in favour of 
selective intervention. Stiglitz’s work provided ammunition to the so-called post-Washington 
Consensus9. There are, also, economists (Alice Amsden etc.) who point the finger at the East 
Asian experience and emphasise that – in that case – public intervention went farther and 
constructed comparative advantages against the background of the operation of market forces. 
 Obviously, the paradigm embraced by policymakers cannot leave policy unaffected, be it 
stabilisation, trade, or industrial policy. Applying one or another of the other paradigms 
highlighted above demands understanding the reality of post-communism; huge resource 
misallocation, the precariousness of institutions, and the collapse of Eastern markets indicate the 
existence of much friction in the system and explain why production imploded. 
                                                 
8 “The 10 commandments” are described in John Williamson (1994) 
9 He says: “…failures of reforms in Russia and most of the former Soviet Union are not just due to sound 
policies being poorly implemented. I argue that the failures go deeper, to a misunderstanding of the foundations 
of a market economy as well as a misunderstanding of the basics of an institutional reform process…reform 
models based on conventional neoclassical economics are likely to under-estimate the importance of 
informational problems, including those arising from the problems of corporate governance; of social and 
organizational capital; and of the institutional and legal infrastructure required to make an effective market 
economy. They are also likely to underestimate the importance of the creation of new enterprises…”(1999, p.1) 
 11
 When viewed in relationship with institutional change and structural rigidities the dispute 
shock therapy vs. gradualism loses much of its relevance for change cannot take place via a ‘big 
bang’. At the same time, gradualism is out of touch with reality when it ignores the institutional 
dissolution of the former command system, the collapse of external markets, and, consequently, 
the inability to control change from above (as in China, for example). 
 Policy-making is also influenced by the competition between different models: the 
Continental vs. the Anglo-Saxon .  It is true that globalisation brings models nearer and this is 
pertinently exemplified by the debate on corporate governance and labour markets. However, 
differences among variants are still substantial and rooted in institutional specificity, which 
predetermines economic and social performance. This competition affects policy-formulation in 
the transforming economies in domains like the role of capital markets (vs. banks) in allocating 
resources, the size of the public sector, the role and the nature of state intervention in the 
economy, the content of the welfare state, etc. Clearly, the countries which want to join the EU 
have to shape their institutional frameworks accordingly. 
 
A clever policy needs to incorporate the effects of technological progress and of globalisation; 
namely, the need for flexible markets, for higher adaptability, has to be reconciled with the 
demands of building up human capital and of creating public goods as positive externalities. 
This is why the debate on the capitalism in the making in post-communist countries is justified 
and highly relevant for policymaking. 
 
  
The pursuit of public purpose: the need for public policies 
 
The magic words of transformation are liberalisation, privatisation, stabilisation, and opening. 
Nonetheless, it would be hard for someone to dispute on solid grounds the need for public policy 
in the transforming economies. I quoted Larry Summers on the pursuit of public purpose, at the 
start of my article. Likewise, J. Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern, the chief economists of the World 
Bank and the EBRD, respectively, stressed ‘A well functioning economy requires a mix of 
government and markets. The balance, structure and functioning of that mix is at the heart of a 
development strategy’ (1997, p.1). The real issue at stake is, therefore, the nature and the scope 
of public policy. For instance, after the events of recent years, in most of the transforming 
economies, can one deny the need of proper regulations regarding banking industry and capital 
markets?  
 Some – such as Kenichi Ohmae – would argue that economic globalisation destroys the 
effectiveness of national economic policy, implicitly, of public intervention; moreover, the 
relevance of the nation-state, as a relevant economic entity, is strongly questioned. However, 
what economists call the ‘one price law’ does function as a tendency and imperfectly; and the 
claimed mobility of  factors of production is much too incomplete and asymmetric in the 
contemporary world. Let us think only of the ‘mobility’ of labour and of technological progress 
– the latter seen as an outcome of ‘clusters’ of technologies (Michael Porter). 
 In the world, there are powerful factors at work, which push globalisation. Moreover, values 
and norms specific to industrial civilisation are to be highlighted, aside from the integration of 
financial markets. Such factors have a strong impact on the formulation and the effectiveness of 
national policies. Nonetheless, globalisation should not be equated with uniformisation and, 
particularly, equalisation of conditions; globalisation can coexist with and even deepen, 
economic gaps.10 Additionally, if attention is directed to the soft portion of a societal aggregate 
                                                 
10 See William Greider (1997) and recent UNDP data 
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 – that which ensures social cohesion, and which makes individuals become members of a 
community (Gemeinschaft) – things get more complicated for analysis.Related to the ideas 
mentioned above it is worthwhile recalling Ernest Gellner’s thesis that nation states can be a 
driving force behind modernisation (catching-up). 
 
 The fact is that the world is made up of national aggregates which reveal different economic 
dynamics. If the world were atomised, and borders (not only geographic) were irrelevant, no 
major economic discrepancies would be detectable among areas. This is why it makes sense to 
think in terms of the quality of national institutional settings and of national economic policies. 
If this line of reasoning is accepted, public policy gains its rationale as macroeconomic policy, 
economic policy in a broad sense – including foreign investment, education and development of 
infrastructure – trade policy, social policy, and last but not least, the working out (or the 
preservation) of a societal model hypostasised by values, principles and a ‘social glue’. An 
explicit or an implicit ‘social contract’ between the citizenry and government is also to be 
included.  
 Public policy refers to norms and procedures as well; without them policy could easily 
degenerate into malignant authoritarianism. 
 
 The developing world is multicoloured with respect to the quality of public policies. Thus, 
past decades in Latin America show how not to practise public intervention. Exacerbated 
populism in economic policy, large budget deficits (which were financed inflationarily), 
overbloated public sectors, extreme import substitution and heavy subsidisation of unperforming 
industries, social and political clienteles, huge income inequalities, etc, are features of the ill 
famed Latin American model. A glaring example of what bad public policies do is Argentina of 
thirty years ago, which changed from a prosperous country before the Second World War into an 
economic mess during the years of Peronist policies. Likewise, Venezuela, in spite of its 
enormous riches showed very poor public management in recent decades. In addition, there are 
examples in Southeast Asia where public policy proved successful. The results of the Asian 
Tigers in the seventies and the eighties were due, essentially, to sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals, high savings ratios, and clever public intervention in the economy. Their 
experience teaches the importance of export orientation, of educational build-up, and of 
infrastructure development. At the same time, the recent very severe and  prolonged financial 
crisis in East Asia highlights the economic merits of transparency, self-restraint, and strong 
institutions including healthy financial entities. 
  
In history one hardly finds examples of successful economic catching-up which did not involve 
exceptional vision and effective public policy. Therefore, the question is not whether public 
authorities should intervene in the economy; it is how and how much they should. I even dare to 
say that the abysmal record of economic transformation in most of the post-communist countries 
may lead to a resurrection of development economics. In this context I value the World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Framework(CDF) 
 
 A conclusion is easy to infer: although there is a demand for it, the construction of a wise and 
effective public policy is a hard task for policymakers bearing in mind the risk of committing 
major errors. Moreover, it can be argued that, in the case of post-communist countries one is 
faced with an almost innate lack of capacity (including the mindset) to formulate and implement 
public policies – which is due to the legacy of communism. But this state of affairs cannot 
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obliterate the need for public policy, for rallying efforts for the sake of modernization.11 The big 
question is therefore: how to work out and implement clever public policies, which, on the one 
hand, should unleash the forces of creativity and the energy of individuals, and on the other 
hand, should solve problems which require state intervention – without bringing the demons of 
totalitarian thinking and practice back to life.  
 
3.1 Three major policy challenges 
 
I would submit that post-communist countries face three historical challenges:  
a) institutional construction (transformation);  
b) economic catching-up; 
c) ensuring social stability.  
 
In what follows, several initial remarks are made on these challenges.Firstly, the special 
historical and political context has to be underlined, namely, the transformation of the former 
command systems into market based democratic polities. The political dimension of the ‘Great 
Transformation’ started in 1989, implies the conquest – by citizens – of political freedoms and 
the build-up of political democracy. Therefore, the thesis can be advanced that, in Central and 
Eastern Europe, authoritarian12 forms of government, of managing transformation, would be 
rejected by citizens and would cause themselves instability (I do not include here the CIS and 
most of the Balkans). I should admit that another logic could be applied as well: reforms can 
bring about a certain instability and the inability of authorities to administer them would favour 
the accession to power of authoritarian governments. Russia and other former Soviet republics – 
but not only them – can easily fall into this pattern. For this reason, analysis needs to be 
differentiated and consider various circumstances, changes, which can consolidate, or not, 
democratic processes. 
 This thesis should be judged from the perspective of other modernisation efforts – like in 
Asia where authoritarianism has been conspicuous for decades now. 
 Secondly, a distinction should be made between modernisation and economic growth, though, 
in a broad sense, the first notion comprehends the latter as an expression of the dynamic 
performance of institutions. Simultaneously, dealing with structural strain and macroeconomic 
stabilisation are put under the umbrella of sustainable fast growth since they condition the latter.  
 Finally, the conventional analytical matrix represented by notions such as price liberalisation, 
stabilisation, and privatisation cannot capture each of the three major challenges. 
 Institutional change has not been neglected in debates but the burden of the past and the 
‘path-dependency’ issue need to be given more attention. In this respect, two important aspects 
deserve to be underlined. One refers to the impact of institutions on overall economic 
performance; poor institutions explain, inter alia, low yields in agriculture, the fragility of the 
banking sector, or the malfunctioning of democracy. Where there is institutional disarray, or 
chaos (like in Albania), one may have to wait a long time for …”the postman”! Here the key 
issue is the strengthening of state institutions.13 Institutions can also explain why the entrenched 
patterns of corporate governance make the use of resources inefficient. The second aspect 
                                                 
11 Apart from the situation when modernisation can be viewed as a “dissolution” in a modernising transnational 
space –such as the EU, in idealistic terms. But is such a vision realistic taking into account that accession 
implies having achieved already a certain level of development which conditions performance, and that even the 
EU is facing some deep structural economic difficulties. 
12 Authoritarianism should be equated with paternalism. 
13 I am referring to Kevin Costner’s movie where the Postman exemplifies the attempt by individuals to restore 
some order, a sense of belonging to a society. 
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 regards the existence of two types of fragility: one linked with the infant nature of institutions; 
and another type related to the extraordinary magnitude of the changes under way (structural 
strain). 
 It can be inferred that both pre-communist and communist histories influence a post-
communist country’s transformation. Thereby, a modernisation strategy – where it does exist – 
needs to consider the difficulties of institutional build up and the available options; on one hand, 
‘natura non facit saltus’, on the other hand, the ‘making of history’ (as against the mere presence 
in history) and the overcoming of structural traps asks for big ‘historical jumps’, which imply 
vision and wise choices in the realm of institutional construction and modernisation strategy. 
 Rapid economic growth is not easy to achieve for there are no easy blueprints. Although 
conventional theory suggests that any economy that possesses cheap labour has the potential for 
catching up, ultimately what matters is the quality of institutions and of human capital. Again 
one can see the importance of institutions which determine the way resources are combined and 
used, and the overall performance of society. It should also be mentioned that institutions 
explain the size of savings ratios (as a premise for fast economic growth) and the attractiveness 
of a national space for foreign capital. 
 Ensuring social stability is going to be a major challenge in the years ahead. The lessons of 
history teach that distribution tensions in production and consumption affects the homeostasis 
and performance of societies (economies). Globalisation of trade and financial markets puts 
societies under much strain and enhances social fragmentation. The latter can be detected all 
over the world, including the most economically advanced countries. Therefore, in the 
transforming societies, wherein market reforms (including possibly ill conceived privatisation 
schemes) are likely to lead to rapidly increasing economic status differentiation, and against the 
background of citizens’ expectations (who all expected from revolutions to be better off soon), 
even fast economic growth can be accompanied by social tension if wealth discrepancies are 
perceived as too large. Social instability becomes an unavoidable phenomenon in an 
environment which produces marginalised people – or what the current French political 
terminology calls ‘les exclus’ – systematically and on a large scale. 
 From this perspective can be assessed the dire need in the post-communist countries to reform 
‘premature welfare states’ since their total dismantlement hardly seems a realistic policy option 
(much like in Western Europe). In this context should be judged the importance of human capital 
build up, and of public education, as a means to ensure equal opportunities to all citizens. 
  The current debate, in the West, about the evolution of capitalism (The Third Way) has 
relevance for transformation as well.14 Long-term, transformation needs to respond to two sets 
of pressures, domestic and external. This assertion is made for its implications in both 
conceptual and policy terms. For it is one thing to view transformation, in a post-communist 
country, as a simple automatic by-product of world evolution after 1989; and it is something else 
if transformation is viewed as a modernisation process that has a powerful domestic engine. 
Does it make sense to talk about a project of society for what we are building in post-communist 
countries? I think it does. Talking about markets and democracy in an oversimplified way is 
insufficient analytically and cannot help to identity solutions to the acute problems confronting 
economic policy in the short and the long run. 
 
The role of institutional capital 
                                                 
14 In this subject, see also Robert Barrio (1996), Zbignew Brzezinsky, Daniel Cohen, Will 
Hutton, Anthony Giddens (1998) Paul Kennedy, Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Madrick, Geoff Mulgan, 
Lester Thurow, J.D. Davidson and W. Rees-Mogg (1997), etc. 
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High savings ratios and the formation of human capital are essential for promoting rapid and 
sustainable economic growth. This is what both conventional and more recent growth theory 
underline. However, the primary determinants of growth and modernisation are to be sought 
elsewhere, namely, in the realm of institutions; the latter determine the quality of policies and 
the overall performance of economy. This thesis is extremely important when applied to the case 
of transforming economies, which face extraordinary challenges, particularly in the field of 
institutional build-up. 
 An attempt to capture institutions conceptually would pin attention on four forms of 
institutional capital: social capital, civic capital, leadership capital, and cohesion capital. 
Among these forms of institutional capital, there are visible linkages; their analytical separation 
is, however, useful. 
 Social capital refers directly to the norms which govern interactions among individuals, 
groups, and organisations. Kenneth Arrow (1974), Robert Putnam (1993), and, lately, Francis 
Fukuyama (1996) stressed the importance of social norms – as a form of social capital – for 
economic development. The difficulty for economic analysis is linked not necessarily with the 
fuzzy nature of the concept, but with the way institutions develop – in an incremental way, but 
without a mechanical determination. The import or the imitation of institutions can be practised 
without, nonetheless, ensuring their required organic assimilation and social embeddedness. 
 Civic capital regards several elements. Among them an essential role is played by the system 
of institutionalised checks and balances, which is supposed to control power (those mandated to 
run public affairs). Another element is represented by civic organisations. Civic capital implies a 
generalised state of mind, of civic behaviour. As in the case of social capital, civic capital poses 
a critical question: are not these two forms of institutional capital – when seen as sources and 
resources of transformation (modernisation) –, themselves, a product of an advanced degree of 
societal development. Namely, do we not have here a vicious circle? This question indicates the 
tension between organicism and constructivism as approaches to transformation (modernisation). 
In the post-communist countries, during extraordinary times, decision-makers are almost 
condemned to be constructivists. Their actions need however to be wise and consistent in order 
to avoid major historical blunders. 
 Leadership capital becomes an issue whenever it is acutely needed. The real world of the life 
of organisations shows that leadership comes to the fore especially during hard times, when 
critical decisions are to be made. Wouldn’t it be better that decisions, themselves, be subject to 
optimisations which should rid us of uncertainty, ‘artistry’, and arbitrariness? On the one hand, 
this is practically impossible; on the other hand, it may be quite undesirable since optimisation 
algorithms are likely to impede creativity and breakthroughs, which lead to competitive edges, to 
progress in general. Moreover, transformation as a led-process involves more than the 
impersonal forces (mechanisms) of markets at work. Leadership, which involves vision and 
determination, cannot and should not be downsized to mere co-ordination. 
 Do post-communist countries have a significant stock of leadership capital? A pessimist 
would answer that a country’s economic and political elites are, themselves, an ‘infant industry’, 
and that spectacular results should not be expected. An optimist would stress the lack of 
homogeneity of humans, the existence, always, of exceptional individuals who can rise to the 
challenge of history, provide a sense of direction, and run organisations (social aggregates). In 
any case, since post-communist transformation is going to be a lasting process the performance 
of post-communist countries’ political and economic elites must have a high common 
denominator along a longer period of time – even if some of these countries have the chance to 
use NATO, the EU, and other international structures as institutional and policy anchors. 
 Cohesion capital is a form of institutional capital, which may sound esoteric to some. I 
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 thought it useful to introduce it within the quadrangle by taking into account the importance of 
social stability for the long-term evolution of society. Here, as well, one encounters the dilemma: 
is social stability a prerequisite or a product of the process? In the same equivocal way, the 
answer springs into the open: social cohesion helps development, or going through difficult 
times, but is, itself, influenced by the process. It should be mentioned relatedly that the stock and 
the flow of social cohesion depend on the functioning of institutions. Therefore, a lot depends on 
the choice of institutional constructs, which lend regularities to and give birth to norms in the 
overall functioning of society. From this perspective, it is fully justified to ask which kind of 
model is more likely to ensure a higher degree of social cohesion concurrently with sustainable 
economic growth. Clearly, this is a question, which has significant policy implications. 
 
4. Looking ahead 
 
One can use a matrix of circumstances and challenges in order to differentiate the various 
“slots” post-communist countries find themselves in. 
Among circumstances I would range: the state of economies; the strength of institutions 
(including state institutions –which becomes a key variable); inter-ethnic relations; geopolitical 
location; commitments to join the EU and NATO, etc 
Among short-term challenges I would include: sustain or resume growth; check (stop) inter-
ethnic strife15; fend off attacks on state institutions (dealing with organized crime)  
 Among longer term challenges I would mention: strenghtening institutions; achieving 
sustainable growth (catching up); social cohesion (fighting poverty); social capital (fighting 
corruption); empowering citizens (strengthening democracy). 
 It is not hard to show that the matrix suggested above permits a taxonomy which indicates 
different probable evolution paths for the transforming countries. These paths can be linked with 
how society evolves, with the links countries forge with the EU and NATO. The Visegrad 
Group, Slovenia, and the Baltics are expected to join the EU before the end of the decade. 
Bulgaria and Romania still need to belabor pretty complicated situations, which are influenced 
by geography as well. In the Balkans things are far away from having been solved; here there is 
need for managing short-term with long-term crises at a time when the political geography of the 
region is not yet clear16. In Russia and Ukraine economics are intricately intertwined with 
politics and both will be under the spell of fuzziness for years to come.    
 
4.1 Variety of capitalism? 
 
 One can already try to identify different evolving models of capitalism among the post-
communist countries, and seek also to speculate on the intensity of cultural and geopolitical 
(Western Europe’s vs. Russia’s) influence in each case. This variety of models has to be judged 
in a substantive and a formal sense. Formally, all these countries are implementing market 
reforms, and some of them signed Association Agreements with the European Union. It can be 
said, also, that these agreements, and the other links with the pan-Western European institutions, 
have created a sort of an evolution guiding ‘straitjacket’ – which can be seen as synonymous to 
the ‘anchor’. Nonetheless, post-communist countries differentiate among themselves in terms of: 
the quality of actual institutional development; the quality of macroeconomic fundamentals; and 
the resultant economic performances. These qualitative differences – many of which are of an 
intangible nature – are essential when screening the prospects for each individual country. 
Countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia seem to go the Western way, 
                                                 
15 In the case of Russia this is more complicated when it involves separation attempts (recently, in Dagestan) 
16 There are basically four protectorates in the Balkans. 
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though one cannot – and should not – dismiss possible serious stumbling and setbacks on the 
road . The Baltic countries are moving along the same model, although at a slower pace. 
More vacillating, though making strenuous efforts, are Bulgaria and Romania, which are 
burdened by the effects of delayed reform measures, including privatisation, and the relatively 
more complicated communist legacy.  
For many post-communist countries (in tha Balkans and the CIS) the danger is to fall into the 
institutional traps of a bad model – with cleptocracy, authoritarian politics, ubiquitous 
corruption, socially damaging growing income inequality and intense social strife. Such an 
evolution, should it be sealed through early accession of some countries into NATO and the EU, 
would accentuate the divide among the European post-communist countries. It may even cause 
intense disappointment among population at large, whose tolerance for the costs of reforms has 
been significantly sweetened (until now) by the promises of joining the two Western clubs. This 
would, clearly, have important consequences for ‘high politics’ on the European continent and 
would have implications on the shaping of spheres of influence; it would also fit the logic which 
says that accession is conditional on actual individual performances.  
In a different vein, one could argue that such a policy-accentuated divide is shortsighted to 
the extent it neglects the different initial circumstances and other geopolitical considerations. For 
example, could one overlook the bilateral Romanian-Hungarian relationship in view of the 
precedent created by the ‘discipline’ imposed by NATO on Greece and Turkey. Additionally, 
one could argue that the best way to fight social and political anomie in various countries  is via 
integration and the avoidance of discriminatory gestures.  
It can be stated that the more laggard a transforming country is, and the closer it is to Russia 
geographically, the more critical for its future is the nature of capitalism in the latter country. 
Here I have in mind not only the “gravitational power” of Russia, but, in particular, the high 
uncertainty surrounding evolution in that country. Conversely, it can be submitted that the closer 
is a country geographically to the EU, the more likely it undergoes the influence of the EU 
‘anchor’. A similar thesis can be submitted regarding the nature of domestic politics, with 
Russian developments providing a strong demonstration effect, if not direct influence.  
What are then the prospects for Russian capitalism? “… the new economy is very much 
market-based, but it is also «anarchic», predatory, corrupt and oligarchic... unfortunately, the 
maldistribution of wealth and power is likely to give Russia a rentier economy that fails to 
provide the competitive dynamism the country desperately needs and its elite expects. It will 
also make democracy less workable, since it must pit a deprived and resentful majority against a 
wealthy minority”17. One danger is populism but the more likely outcome is repression’. 18 
The growing profile of those who advocate a more authoritarian rule in Russia, and the 
likelihood for it to come into being, can be judged also by the rising number of high-ranking 
military (members of the secret services) people in politics (government). The temptation of 
authoritarian rule can be discerned in other post-communist countries as well, which is explained 
by the mood of large segments of the population – who want some ‘order’ restored. 
 
4.2 EU enlargement 
 
The Euro was officially launched as the common currency of the EU on Janury 1st of 1999.  
This event is a milestone in the construction of the Monetary Union, in the deepening of the EU; 
it is also a specific response to the ongoing intense debate on the future shape and content of the 
                                                 
17 Christa Freeland, 1995  
18  ‘Today’s Russia makes excruciatingly plain that liberal values are threatened just as 
thoroughly by state incapacity as by despotic power’ (Stephen Holmes, 1997, p. 32). 
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 Union, which goes beyond the foreseen and unforeseen implications of Germany’s reunification 
and the collapse of communism in Europe.  While deepening is a euphemism for the need to 
rethink (reengineer) the Union under the current historical circumstances, enlargement connotes 
the exigency of remaking the architecture of the Union by taking into account the changed 
geopolitical map of Europe. In this new context takes place the creation of the Monetary Union 
(MU) which, according to a strand of thought, is the means to further the integration of Europe 
by not slowing down the process to the lowest common denominator.  
Different ‘cultures of stability’ (Stabilitätskulturen) and different approaches to political 
integration clash in the battle for deepening the EU. Related to the controversies surrounding the 
MU I would emphasise two issues. One regards the relationship between the MU and the 
economic challenges facing the member countries. As remarked by the President of the 
Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer, the monetary union is   ‘no panacea’ for Europe’s ills. Therefore, 
the MU should not be seen as a deus ex machina that can solve the structural problems of the 
member countries. The second issue regards consequences of the formation of the single-
currency area for the Eastern enlargement of the Union. The formation of a  ‘hard-core’ would 
have important implications for the future dynamics of the Union and would send several 
messages. These messages, inter alia, are: that a multi-speed Union is in the making; that 
‘delinkages’ (fractures) are possible and quite likely, in spite of the avowed commitments to 
convergence of development levels; that the economically stronger post-communist countries 
could join a ‘soft’ area of the Union in a foreseeable future (most optimistically, around year 
2004-2006); that new cleavages are likely to appear both inside the unified Europe (EU), and 
between the latter and other European countries, etc. 
A major political question is what can be done so that seemingly unavoidable cleavages – in 
a multi-speed Europe – do not imperil stability and security on the Continent. In this respect, 
obviously, I have in mind the special case of Southeastern Europe, which is mired in political 
and economic difficulties, and interethnic conflicts. 
Likewise, the state of economies in Central and Eastern Europe will help, or not, their 
intention to become members of the Union. If it is hard for some relatively advanced market 
economies (like Italy, Spain, and even the UK) to comply with the requirements of economic 
policy discipline within the EU, it is easy to imagine what could happen with countries that are 
much more likely to experience relatively high inflation rates, and which are prone to incur large 
budget deficits in the future owing to powerful social pressures. Is it realistic to assume that CEE 
countries would be able to submit themselves to the financial and monetary rigour of the Union? 
Or, maybe one has to think that the Union will develop a variable geometry and, consequently, 
the CEE countries will be able to join the ‘soft’ group at the beginning, or form an even ‘softer’ 
group on their own. 
But even in such a case, only the best performing CEE countries would have a reasonable 
chance to cope with the competitive pressures implied by membership in the Union. 
  
The role of geography 
 
Geography is important in Europe and geopolitics plays an important role in understanding 
countries’ specific goals and motives. Geography can also help explain the prospects for EU 
enlargement. For instance, in Germany’s case, its Eastern neighbours present a strategic interest 
in severas respects and this is why Bonn supports their accession into the EU. As a well known 
German journalist remarked ‘the stabilisation of Germany’s immediate Central European 
hinterland is the more urgent task’(J.Joffe)  
Even in pure economic terms, Germany's Eastern neighbours present attractiveness, which 
compares not unfavourably with the less developed (southern) members of the EU. An article in 
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the leading German journal of foreign affairs notes several assets which make Central and 
Eastern Europe and, especially, the Visegrad Group a preferred zone of economic interest.19 
These assets are defined as: a development potential which is considered to be ‘much greater’ 
than in the peripheral regions of Western Europe, the geographic proximity, the labour skills and 
the standards of research and training, a structure of production which is ‘much more advanced 
than that of the southern members of the EU’, and very low wage levels (see Table 4). The same 
German journalist considers that Central European countries, ‘above all the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, are Germany’s Mexico’: ‘next door, and with workforces that offer high productivity 
rates at about one-tenth of German wage levels. Their markets are ideally suited for 
penetration’.Available figures support this outlook. Thus, according to data provided by 
Commerzbank, over a third of the merchandise trade carried on between Central and Eastern 
Europe and the OECD states is done with Germany20 The same source mentioned also that, in 
mid-nineties Germany’s exports to the Visegrad Group countries were by 15% higher than its 
deliveries to East Asia. Concurrently, almost 10% of Germany’s direct investments went to these 
four economies, up from only 0.5% in 1989. Germany is also the main trading partner of other 
post-communist countries. It is fair to assume that, over the long term, German investments in 
those countries would grow considerably as well. 
One can easily imagine a scenario according to which Germany will expand and deepen 
economic links with its Eastern neighbours, much to the chagrin of other members of the EU. 
Should such a dynamic take place it would have many and significant implications for future 
developments in Europe, for the distribution of economic power and of political influence 
among groups of countries. Such a scenario would gain in likelihood should the process of 
European wide integration stumble, or slow down.  
The Mediterranean members of the Union, which fear the competitive pressures of additional 
low-wage members, feel to be increasingly under the threat posed by a destabilising Balkans or 
the northern African fringe. Trade-offs and dilemmas can be easily detected here as well. It is 
clear that the different perceptions between France, Italy, and Spain on one hand, and Germany 
and the Nordic countries, on the other hand, regarding the security threats to Europe will be a 
major contending issue for years to come. 
It can be submitted that how CEE countries’ quest for accession is treated depends also on 
bargains and compromises reached within the EU, and among its most important members.  
It can be expected with a high degree of certainty that Germany, in particular, because of its 
growing economic power, will get a higher profile in the way decisions are made within the EU. 
In addition, I would submit that this is going to happen irrespective of how the further 
construction of the EU takes place.  
With respect to the EU, it remains to be seen whether the different political and economic 
weights of the current members will facilitate the making of fundamental decisions including the 
attitude vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe. Much depends on how prerogatives are split 
between Brussels and the national governments of the member countries and, also, on the 
mechanics of and the human touch behind the decision-making process. 
One can pose a related question. Is the EU ready to undergo fundamental revisions, which 
should correspond to the new reality in Europe and to the need of integrating economically and 
politically the post-communist countries? Likewise, is the EU prepared to move forward viewing 
enlargement as a way of helping the process of systemic transformation in the post-communist 
countries by taking into account their current fragility? Is the EU ready to undertake 
programmes and projects, normally carried out in its poorer member states, which should 
precede and enhance enlargement? Again, one is forced to return to the conclusion that the big 
                                                 
19 J. Noetzold, 1995 
20 Idem 
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 push now cannot take place without strong leadership and a vision, which should encompass the 
whole of Europe. Will Romano Prodi and Javier Solana change the vision? It remains to be seen.  
 
The main economic issues 
 
There are several issues which make up the economics of the relationship between the EU and 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
Regarding trade, the conventional wisdom is that the low wage countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe pose a big threat to several of the weaker sectors of the EU, which is a 
perception frequently met in the West. This policy rationale is publicised in the Western media 
and has become part of the public consciousness in Western Europe. The public debate 
surrounding this issue resembles much that which accompanied the formation of NAFTA, the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Area. Likewise, the menace to jobs was the stick wielded by 
politicians, some technocrats, and trade unionists. 
What is very likely and much less known is that the European Union has been running trade 
surpluses. It is true that, in a bilateral relationship, the counterpart of sizeable capital inflows is a 
considerable trade deficit, and one may think that this is a proper pattern for structuring East-
West European economic relations for years to come – as a reflection of a presumed joint effort 
to build up the economies in transition. However, things need to be seen in a proper light. Thus, 
although the CEE countries trade more than 60% with the EU, their trade is not exclusively 
bilateral; this means that they could get capital inflows from other sources as well, which may 
allow them to run smaller trade deficits with the EU. Additionally and what is more important, 
the trade deficit in itself does not say much about the potential of CEE countries to sell on 
Western markets. A country can incur the same trade deficit at widely different volumes of its 
exports and imports. This fact may not be so important for the West, where the economies are 
operating close to their capacity levels, but it is of vital importance for the East where the level 
of economic activity is still much depressed; for Central and Eastern Europe an export drive 
would be tantamount to the revival of their economies through what economists call an export 
multiplier effect. 
While Central and Eastern European countries are very open to trade than their Western 
partners, they are a long way from being as sophisticated as the latter in terms of the utilisation 
of non-tariff barriers. In addition, it is well known that these barriers are frequently a much more 
serious impediment to trade than tariffs. 
A natural consequence of the protectionistic stance of the EU is that CEE countries may have 
to reconsider the benefits of almost total ‘unilateral free trade’ and try to protect themselves. 
 The discussion about foreign investment concentrates on its impact on domestic jobs in the 
West. There are some who emphasise that, instead of investing at home, Western companies are 
running away with jobs towards the low wage countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There 
are several counterarguments which need to be made in this respect. One counterargument is that 
foreign investment can stimulate trade significantly, and the figures indicate clearly that Western 
Europe has benefited from the functional economic opening between the two parts of Europe. 
Therefore, one could surmise that, on balance, net job creation was positive in Western Europe. 
Secondly, the capital flows into Central and Eastern Europe have been much under what was 
expected immediately after 1989. It is no surprise, in this context, that Hungary has been taking 
almost half of all the external inflows to the region. In her case, one can see the fruits of market 
reforms which were undertaken well before the demise of the communist regime. Together, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland got almost 3/4 of the total FDI inflows into Central 
and Eastern Europe, in the period 1990-1997 21. And a final counterargument: it is not higher 
                                                 
21 Transition Report, 1998, p.81 
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investment that could provide the main instrument for dealing with high unemployment in 
Western Europe. The functioning of labour markets, the remaking of the institutional set-up, the 
redesign of the welfare system, and better education would have to do the primary job to this 
end. 
Labour mobility is a much debated issue since it could turn into highly perturbing 
immigration for the West and could exacerbate domestic tensions. Laszlo Valki and Laszlo 
Csaba made, nevertheless, a valid point in this respect by referring to the experience of the 
United States, where an income difference of 1:3 was the threshold which induced substantial 
movement of people; above that, each percentage of income differential caused 0.026% 
migration. Their view is that this fact does not support the visions of Central and Eastern 
Europeans’ pouring into the other half of Europe, ‘since the differences in standards of living, 
measured realistically, through purchasing power parity, do not show a larger difference than 
1:2.5 or 1:3’ – see also Table 1. 
I would make several additional comments on their worthy observation. First, it does apply 
particularly to the more developed post-communist countries. Secondly, for the latter there is 
already a safety valve created by the more favourable treatment of their citizens by the Western 
neighbouring countries. Thirdly, one should think also of the distributional effects of reforms on 
migration; these effects could be quite significant in the less developed countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. And finally, I would consider also the potential pressure exerted on labour 
markets in Eastern Europe by a possible increasing inflow of people from Third World 
countries; some of the CEE countries have turned into immigration countries.This pressure may 
stimulate Central and Eastern Europeans to search for work outside their countries. This inflow 
may increase considerably in the years to come, and Central and Eastern European governments 
may not be able to stem it. Besides, it appears that organised crime, in its efforts to diversify its 
activities, has realised the potential and possible gains in this field. In the longer run, the threat 
would fade away since Western Europe needs substantial new entry into its workforce owing to 
its ageing population. There is a need to manage the problem in the short and medium-term. 
Aid does raise the eyebrows of many Western officials for a couple of reasons. One is linked 
with the general development level of CEE countries, which would imply a heavy burden for the 
West in terms of development aid – assuming that enlargement were to occur in a few years. On 
the other hand, one could argue that the budget level in itself does not provide a good yardstick. 
Laszlo Csaba argues in this vein when he remarks that  ‘on the basis of the EU’s present 
budgetary spending, only about 0.25% of EU gross domestic product is likely to be channelled 
in annual transfers to new members from the Visegrad Group. In Germany, by contrast, 5% of 
annual GDP is being transferred to the Eastern Länder’. 
Another reason is that development aid to CEE countries would severely clash with the 
current competing claims on the EU budget – with the farmers’ lobbies and the big recipients of 
development aid (Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece).  
A big dilemma for Central and Eastern European governments could be formulated in this 
way: let us assume that the EU decides to let them in, the near future, and also, that their 
institutional and legal build-up, as well as the functioning of their democratic institutions, match 
the provisions of the l’acquis communautaire. Does it mean that they will be able to cope with 
the competitive pressures of the EU environment after the removal of the temporary adjustment 
facilities, which cover a period of some years only? Can the CEE countries benefit – like the 
member countries of the EU do – on powerful enough safeguards in case something goes terribly 
wrong? Partially, the same question can be posed for the other side as far as the so called 
‘sensitive’ sectors are concerned; but it is clear that CEE countries – particularly the less 
developed ones – could face infinitely bigger problems should not their low wages and learning 
potential compensate the considerably inferior overall productivity. 
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 Certainly, one can add the possibility of using the exchange rate as a protective weapon in 
case they stay outside the ‘hard-core’ and, therefore, are not subject to the harsh discipline of the 
monetary union. This would be possible in the framework of an extended application of the 
concept of multi-speed Europe. Nonetheless, the Eastern European countries would still have to 
apply strict monetary and fiscal policies in order to avoid being led too much astray in terms of 
macroeconomic performances; an8d they would also have to view quite reservedly devaluation, 
since the latter could fuel inflation in an environment which is already prone to relatively strong 
inflationary pressures. 
In any case, should the EU policymakers internalise broadly defined economic and security 
interests, a solid package of pre-enlargement supporting measures is required in order to ease the 
actual process of enlargement and reduce the psychological costs of waiting. 
 
4.3 South-east Europe 
 
Individual and collective tragedies marked the life of most people in South East Europe, 
particularly in the space of the former Yugoslavia, during this decade. Demons of the past 
reemerged. Civil wars and among newly appeared states, ethnic and religious conflicts, ethnic 
cleansing, long fights for redefining the political map of the region, make up the context of 
unimaginable sufferings of millions of people.  
 
The termination of the current military conflict  did not rid, however,  South East Europe (the 
Balkans) of its deep-seated, latent animosities and other sources of conflict –of future conflicts. 
It seems to me that crisis-management in this region is of a different sort, in the sense of having 
to be projected long-term; it has to be an exercise linked with the nature of conflicts among the 
local players. It may  take years and years, if not decades for injuries to heal. It may require the 
presence of “outsiders” for a long period of time. However, analogies with the end of the second 
World War should not be over-stretched. 
 
The conflicts of the last ten years have outlined South East Europe as the very sick region  of the 
Continent, with increasingly remote prospects for most of the countries, therein, of belonging to 
the select Clubs (NATO and the EU). For the purpose of analysis Greece and Slovenia are 
excluded from this injunction.  
 
Whereas some of the new entities of the former Yugoslavia are still in the search of state 
stability and, economically, in a state of distress, Romania and Bulgaria have extremely difficult 
economic situations. Albania is the most glaring example of the pains the transition economies 
have in building up solid institutions. The region is the least developed of the Continent. It is fair 
 to say that it is this region which causes most of the headaches for European policymakers and 
legitimates powerfully the talk about rising new divides on the Continent. It is true that a similar 
logic (language) can be applied on an East-West axis, when one refers to Ukraine and Russia as 
well. However, I would say that the sense of urgency is and should be much higher  for the 
Balkans. What happened in the last ten years in  this region, in terms of losses of human life,  
substantiates this assertion. 
 
Tackling South East Europe, in my view, needs to be judged from two inter-related perspectives. 
One is the long-term exercise in crisis-management mentioned above, which aims at arresting 
(reversing) bad path-dependencies. The second perspective concerns reconstruction, which 
would have to be a two-pronged strategic endeavor: physical reconstruction (after  the years of 
military ravages); and development (modernization), that includes the political process as well. 
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Thinking about the two perspectives hinges on several  working assumptions: 
-     trying to redraw the borders in the region is a very dangerous game; 
- unless the region gains a certain amount of stability and mutual tolerance among the local 
players, it would be hard to embark on region-wide reconstruction;  mutual tolerance would 
involve changes in collective psychology; 
- crisis-management does not exclude starting economic reconstruction; the sooner Serbia is 
involved in this process the better. 
- crisis-management and resolution involves a tremendous effort for confidence-building 
(injury-healing), which would be well addressed by restoring economic  ties among the local 
players; this means developing economic cooperation in the region, among the former 
components of the old Yugoslavia as well; 
- crisis-management has to consider the extreme institutional frailty of the countries in the 
region and their heightened vulnerability to both domestic and external shocks; 
- crisis-management needs to be more prevention- than reactive-oriented; to this end there is 
need for a better understanding of the roots of collective psychology in the region;   
- clear prospects of economic reconstruction  would give the people in the region hopes and, 
particularly, incentives to think less about the past and more about a better future; 
- there is need for considerable and creative aid (from outside), in the vein of a Grand Plan. If 
a new Marshall Plan did not come into being in the aftermath  of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
working out a plan now for this region is almost a must. Actually, seeds of such a grand 
scheme exist already: The Stability Pact, the South Eastern European Initiative (SECI), the 
Central European Initiative. But these seeds need to be fused into a single grand plan for the 
sake of focusing energy, providing effective leadership, and using resources better. With 
Romani Prodi at the helm of the EU, certainly, Brussels  will become much more sensitive to 
the plight of the region.  
- Bulgaria and Romania should be covered by such a plan. Both countries can operate as in-
built political stabilizers, but are themselves in need of economic support. 
- The Plan should consider more forceful measures for dealing with various social and 
institutional evils which plague the region ( drug-trafficking, arms-smuggling, etc). This 
would be also part of the long-term exercise in crisis-management (confidence-building).  
 
 
5. Final remarks 
 
We were, in the East, especially in the early 90s, quite oblivious to the fact that Western 
Europe itself was going through hard times. That there, there is need for reforming the welfare 
state, for more flexibility, for regaining vitality in a world subjected to the growing pressures of 
globalisation, of competition. Even the introduction of the Euro is read by some as a “weapon”, 
whether it is declared publicly or not. It’s about competition in the world. And it’s not clear what 
is going to happen in the period to come because the European Union has to deal with its own 
structural problems.   
Ironically, the euphoria following the collapse of the Berlin Wall met with Euro-scepticism in 
the West. Although, one has to admit, that bouts of Euro-scepticism have been recurrent along 
the path of European integration. Let’s remember, for instance, the late sixties which were 
pertinently illustrated, as a political mood, by J.J. Servan Schreiber’s book, “Le Defi Americain” 
(The American Challenge); or later, during the 80s, the fear of Japan Inc. and the Asian Tigers. 
 Another irony is that whereas, at the beginning of transition, in Central and Eastern Europe 
some aired the idea of a ‘dritter Weg” (remember Zdenek Mlynar), which was, on justified 
grounds,  rejected by most politicians, nowadays, many social-democratic governments in the 
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 West are seaching for a “Third Way”; where the latter is meant to preserve perceived advantages 
of the “Continental model” and help deal with the impact of globalisation and information 
technologies.  Would this search influence Enlargement? What is certain is that, in most post-
communist countries, much of the fundamentals of market based systems is quite fragile and a 
lot of work still needs to be done.  
 The increasing reluctance of western Europeans to accept quick admissions into the EU, or a 
defined calendar, is a reflection of the growing discrepancy between the rhetoric of Enlargement 
and what happens in reality, under the spell of pragmatic considerations. For policy-makers 
calculate costs and benefits, and they need hard data to this end; it goes without saying that they 
have a very difficult time in incorporating the soft variables of Enlargement, such as the costs of 
non-enlargement. Therefore, the conclusions and decisions they reach are skewed by leaving 
aside what is not clear, or hard to estimate, like political or geopolitical consequences of 
integration, which, over the longer term do have an economic impact. To all this conundrum one 
has to add the Balkans quagmire, which mirrors ghosts of the past and the present, and, also, the 
inability of Europeans to identify a way out at the very moment of trying to achieve a united 
Europe. 
 Europe needs to be embedded into the dynamics of the world. And, in this respect, I wish to 
highlight the growing complexity of the world, of the world economy? I stress the notion of 
complexity for, I think, there is here a psychological and a cognitive problem. We, probably, got 
used to a certain type of stability, which was couched in the structures of the bipolar world and 
of a simple ideological confrontation, but also in the sort of an apparent liniarity of technological 
progress. We live in a different environment nowadays; the trend towards a multipolar world, the 
new information technologies which enhance globalisation, the clash between integration and 
fragmentation, the sometimes violent instances of “clash of civilisations” (to use Samuel 
Huntington’s famous sintagma) etc.  These phenomena are something which, we have a 
difficulty in digesting analytically and responding operationally. In this context one has to 
mention the globalisation of financial markets and the ensuing very severe financial crisis which 
has engulfed many emerging markets, in East Asia, Russia and elsewhere. But I would recall 
that previous signs of the financial “El Nino” were delivered by the Mexican crisis in late 1994 
and, quite revealingly, by the turbulence around the Exchange Rate Mechanism during 1992-
1993. 
 Many astute watchers and professional heavyweights are stunned by the rapidity of events 
and the spread of turmoil. From “irrational exuberance” to “irrational stampede out” is a way to 
illustrate the functioning of large scale volatile capital, which leaves many unanswered questions 
and befuddles policy-makers. More dismayingly, it can lead to social and economic dislocations 
which, through their proportions, are reminiscent of the Great Depression. Think about the plight 
of tens of millions of people in Indonesia and elsewhere. Or a few years earlier, in Mexico, after 
the dramatic fall of the Peso. This is why we need to worry about, formulate the right questions 
(about what went wrong) and try to find right policy responses.  
  There is need for more humility when approaching this state of affairs, including more 
intellectual self-scrutiny and honesty in dialogue, as there is need for more genuine leadership in 
policy-making. Some are saying that there is a leadership vacuum, and that this explains why 
political solutions are not ready at hand. But this vacuum was mentioned by the London based 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in the early 90s, much ahead of the current world 
financial crisis. This would indicate leadership shortage as a sign of the troubles governments 
encounter in our changing world, the difficulties they have in understanding and managing 
change. 
 Joining the European Union, to a large extent, overlaps with what post-communist countries 
have to do, under any circumstances, in order to create market based economies and democratic 
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polities, or what Karl Popper named open societies; which means, irrespective of whether a post-
communist country decides to join the EU or not.  Creating open societies is a much more 
complex and complicated process than what is assumed by price liberalisation, privatisation, and 
economic opening. These headline words cannot capture the nature of institutional and cultural 
change, the strain in the systems plagued by terrible resource misallocation. This is why, unless 
buttressed by change in the real economy and the functioning of institutions, macroeconomic 
stabilisation is only temporary and numbers can be very misleading. Four years ago Albania was 
hailed as a miracle, with 4% annual inflation rate. 7, 8 months ago Russia was having an annual 
inflation rate of cca. 10%. And we all saw what occurred,  against the background of 
institutional disarray and hardly sustainable policies. It has always been my opinion that 
insufficient attention has been paid, theoretically, and policy-wise, to the magnitude of required 
resource reallocation in the post-communist countries.  Likewise, it is my view that institutional 
change is what  matters in the end, and that, here, one cannot practice hocus-pocus (voodoo) 
economics; even restructuring hinges on the way institutions do performs. 
 Let me emphasise a thesis which, I hope, will find a simpathetic hearing. Aside from policy 
consistency and a sense of direction, the countries which have scored better results have done it 
owing to better preconditions (the legacy of the past including histories of partial reforms) and 
the geographic proximity to the EU. Isn’t it striking the existence of a cluster of “front runners” 
in the close vicinity of the EU? Investments, foreign capital, which  poured into those countries 
were attracted by policies pursued by government. But clearly there was also a set of initial 
circumstances which favoured good results. What I am concerned about is that for most of the 
lagging countries, for those at the periphery of Europe, a bad path-dependency has been 
developing, which will clobber them for a long period of time. The former ideological and 
political divide, which existed  in the pre-1989 Europe, is being replaced by new divides, which 
have essentially an economic dimension. Unless clever decisions are undertaken by political 
leaders the unification of Europe, in the sense of “economic inclusion” –to use a term much en 
vogue among the politicians of Europe--of most of the post-communist countries, will remain a 
very distant goal. To this unfolding one has to consider the implications of a feeling among the 
citizens in the lagging countries that they do not belong, actually, to the clubs of Europe, to the 
relevant institutional Europe, which may only accentuate disappointments and identity crises.  
 In order to overcome such a new “great divide” vision needs to be accompanied by a strategy 
which should combine much more commitment by Brussels (by the EU governments) with the 
in-house reform efforts of the candidate countries. The EU governments have to labour on three 
fronts: at home; the reform of the EU (the common agricultural policy, regional development, 
etc); and the international dialogue which deals, inter alia,  with the world-wide financial crisis. 
All these fronts do have, directly or indirectly, an impact on Enlargement.  
 Governments in Central and Eastern Europe have to persist in structural reforms  (deep 
restructuring), in building up institutions, in strengthening financial systems. I emphasise the 
need to nurture the development of a strong middle class, a solid civil society, as the backbone 
of well functioning market economies and democracies. Where citizens do not feel empowered 
economically and politically friction is unavoidable and energies do not translate into steadily 
higher overall economic performance. This is why it makes sense to think about the variety of 
capitalism in the making in the post-communist world, in Europe. Trying to answer such a 
question has relevance for the issue of Enlargement as well.  
The dialogue about Enlargement poses a major question from the perspective of the political 
economy of the process. How can people in the West get a level of comfort with this process, 
which should facilitate it? Because, ultimately, it is  not Brussels which will decide on the speed, 
the pace of admission, but national governments --governments which are accountable to their 
electorates. If western citizens won’t feel comfortable with admission, if they will think that this 
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 is going to increase structural employment, politically articulated interests will not retard to 
reflect those anxieties. And this politically articulated opposition is likely to cause a delayed 
process of admission. I am not one of those who are asking for a very quick admission, 
irrespective of costs, on both sides. I am in favour of realism, of an enlightened pragmatism, 
which should acknowledge the various constraints for rapid Enlargement, but also caution 
against losing sight of the target and the momentum. We all have a stake in it, in forging a true 
partnership at work.  
 As I wish to emphasise again, European dynamics cannot be divorced of developments in the 
world economy. There is so much turmoil there that many knowledgeable people are asking for 
a revision of the architecture of the international economic system, which should replace the 
Bretton Woods structures. Whatever will come out of the current endeavours, it is clear that the 
international system will have to face the increased vulnerability of  those who are less capable 
to weather external shocks.  And here there is a joint paradox and irony. Those who are more 
likely to be forced to brace themselves for dealing with the volatility of large capital movements, 
are less capable to do it because they have fragile institutions and structures; because solid 
institutions cannot be created overnight.  
On a more general plane, if the world economy won’t have the kind of dynamic which would  
prevent the EU from turning more protectionist, from becoming an insulated fortress which 
would divert trade (in a world of  “trading blocs”), a speedier and smooth admission would be 
hard to take place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Basic data, 1998    
        Gross domestic product 
 
 Popu-
lation 
(m) 
Per 
headb 
($) 
Per 
headc 
($) 
Index 
1989=100 
Growth 
(av;%) 
1994-98 
Inflation 
(av;%) 
1994-98 
Exports 
($bn) 
Imports 
($bn) 
Current 
account 
($bn) 
East-central 
Europe 
Hungary 
Poland 
Czech 
Republic 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
66.4
10.1 
38.7 
10.3 
 
5.4 
2.0
7,848 
 
7,865 
6,892 
10,392 
 
8,123 
12,442 
4,421
4,709 
3,879 
5,413 
 
3,878 
9,814
106.4
95.4 
117.3 
95.4 
 
99.8 
104.1
4.6
3.1 
6.0 
2.3 
 
5.9 
4.3
14.4 
 
20.5 
21.3 
9.4 
 
8.4 
12.0 
96.99 
 
20.75 
30.12 
26.36 
 
10.67 
9.10 
118.48
22.87 
43.84 
28.94 
 
12.96 
9.87
-12.27
-2.30 
-6.86 
-1.05 
 
-2.06 
-0.00
Balkans 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
55.6
3.8 
8.3 
4.6 
2.0 
22.5 
10.6
3,916 
1,433 
4,404 
6,402 
2,915 
4,126 
3,100 
1,676
  783 
1,486 
4,663 
1,773 
1,785 
1,206
   68.9
   86.0 
   65.7 
   78.1 
   71.9 
   76.4 
   50.4
   1.2
   5.5 
  -1.9 
   5.6 
   0.4 
   0.0 
   4.4
  71.1 
  19.1 
152.5 
  18.0 
  22.7 
  77.5 
  38.9 
21.60 
 0.22 
 4.29 
 4.60 
 1.32 
 8.30 
 2.86 
31.73
 0.86 
 4.61 
 8.77 
 1.72 
 10.91 
  4.85
  -6.80
  -0.42 
  -0.25 
  -1.55 
  -0.29 
  -3.01 
  -1.28
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Baltics 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
7.6
1.5 
2.5 
3.7
4,563 
5,490 
4,138 
4,480 
2,947
3,660 
2,612 
2,888
   66.1
   80.5 
   59.3 
   65.0
   2.9
   4.7 
   3.0 
   1.9
  23.3 
  23.6 
  18.1 
  27.9 
8.55 
2.68 
1.90 
3.96 
 12.31
  3.80 
  3.03 
  5.48
-2.47
-0.45 
-0.71 
-1.31
CIS 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Moldova 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
283.2
146.5 
 50.1 
10.2 
 4.3 
 3.9 
 7.6 
 5.4 
 15.5 
 4.7 
 
6.1 
4.7 
24.0
3,182 
4,141 
2,143 
4,554 
1,515 
2,508 
1,172 
1,353 
2,721 
1,584 
 
  710 
1,088 
2,031 
1,362
1,888 
  846 
1,394 
  380 
  483 
  538 
  897 
1,434 
  347 
 
 216 
 562 
 508
   56.1
   55.8 
   49.9 
   74.7 
   32.6 
   57.3 
   42.7 
   30.1 
   61.8 
   59.6 
 
   40.7 
   44.3 
   89.0
  -5.2
  -4.9 
-10.3 
  -0.7 
-10.4 
   5.7 
 -3.9 
   0.2 
  -4.6 
  -2.2 
 
  -6.8 
-11.7 
0.1
242.0 
  92.1 
155.6 
280.5 
  62.5 
190.1 
103.4 
263.8 
149.0 
  55.8 
 
241.9 
444.6 
186.9 
107.85 
74.75 
13.70 
  7.08 
  0.64 
  0.23 
  0.68 
  0.19 
  5.76 
  0.54 
 
 0.60 
 0.59 
 3.08 
99.32
57.45 
16.28 
  8.53 
  1.04 
  0.81 
  1.72 
  1.05 
  6.76 
  0.71 
 
  0.77 
  0.98 
  3.21
-5.67
 2.45 
-1.30 
-0.94 
-0.33 
-0.41 
-1.36 
-0.72 
-1.43 
-0.29 
 
-0.22 
-0.64 
-0.48
Eastern 
Europe 
122.0 5,935 
 
3,171    92.3 3.6   46.6 118.59 150.21 -19.07
Eastern 
Europe and 
the former 
Soviet Union 
412.8 4,021 1,926    67.9 -1.8  167.0 234.98 261.84 -27.21
 
bAt purchasing power parities; cAt market exchange rates. 
Sources: National statistics; EIU estimates. 
 
 
Table 2  : Comparative Study of Government Revenues (Total Revenue) for Selected 
Eastern European Countries, 1990-1997 
 
In percent of GDP 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
ROMANIA 39.7 41.9 37.4 33.9 32.1 31.9 29.6 
ALBANIA 46.8 31.5 23.5 25.6 24.5 24.0 ... 
BULGARIA 52.9 40.4 38.4 37.2 39.9 36.2 33.6 
CZECH REPUBLIC ... ... 48.2 50.5 49.4 48.4 ... 
HUNGARY 52.1 50.9 50.0 50.7 49.6 46.6 45.8 
POLAND 45.4 42.4 43.9 47.6 47.2 47.2 45.7 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC ... ... 46.1 44.2 46.3 46.8 ... 
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF estimates. 
 
 
Table 3:   Income per capita in several European countries 
                               
                                                         (in US dollars) 
 
 1993* 
Albania 999 
Romania 2,806 
Lithuania 3,110 
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 Bulgaria 4,100 
Poland  5,010 
Hungary 6,050 
Slovak Republic 6,290 
Estonia 6,320 
Czech Republic 7,541 
Greece 8,429 
Portugal 9,982 
Spain 13,110 
European Union average 17,288 
 
* for the post-communist countries the income is calculated on a PPP (purchasing power parity) basis, which means 
that the figures are higher than the official ones. It can be said that, in general, the figures for the economies in 
transition have to be looked at with caution, especially when the various sources vary considerably in their 
estimates. 
Sources: Transition Report, EBRD, October 1994, p.7; The European Union Survey, The Economist, 22 October 
1994, p.4 
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Table 4:  Monthly wages in several post-communist countries (US dollars/month) 
 
 1997* 
Slovenia 421 
Hungary 308 
Czech Republic 332 
Slovak Republic 283 
Poland 320 
Bulgaria 82 
Latvia 219 
Estonia 257 
Romania 87 
Lithuania 207 
Ukraine 82 
* Gross average monthly wages per employee in manufacturing 
Sources:  IMF data quoted by Transition Report, EBRD, 1998, p.66 
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